In order to encourage investment in telecommunication networks, governments have been encouraged to adopt a regulatory state model, with an independent regulatory authority that is subject to a system of appeals and to parliamentary oversight, providing different forms of accountability. The European Commission has pursued this through a sequence of reforms, with governments of member states delegating powers to regulatory authorities, whose independence has been reinforced by directives and network governance. The model has originally been developed in the USA, where there are complex checks and balances, with procedures laid down in the Administrative Procedures Act, with rigorous lobbying before decisions, later subject to litigation. In Africa, the absence of institutional endowments has led to heads of state retaining much more power, delegating only limited functions to regulatory authority that is very rarely believed to be independent. Consequently, operators have lobbied and done deals with the head of state, leaving the regulatory authority for show.
Introduction
A central pillar of telecommunications policy is the independent national regulatory authority (NRA), 2 considered essential to ensure a 'level playing field' for market players, restraining the power of dominant or incumbent operators, protecting consumers and encouraging investment in networks. The sunk costs of a network expose its investors to risks of expropriation, against which governments have been encouraged to offer administrative and legal assurances that they will not make arbitrary political decisions or favour one operator. 3 This is part of a package of global best practice policies that includes (Intven, et al., 2000; Blackman & Srivastava, 2011) :  Corporatization and privatization;  Financialization;  Liberalization; and  Regulation.
Following advocacy by the USA, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) adopted the following text on independence:
The regulatory body is separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunications services. The decisions of and the procedures used by regulators shall be impartial with respect to all market participants. (WTO, 1996) A surprisingly diverse and large number of countries have made this commitment, often voluntarily (Tuthill, 1997; Tarjanne, 1999) . Unusually China and Japan, two of the largest telecommunications markets, have not created independent authorities, but retained the functions within their ministries, without the matter being brought to a WTO disputes body. 4 Some countries have reinforced their commitments through bilateral trade agreements, notably with the USA, with any failings enumerated by the US Trade Representative (USTR, 2015) .
Yet these commitments have been compromised by continued, if usually incomplete, state ownership of operators (e.g., France and Japan), and by political and administrative traditions in which independence is absent or severely compromised, where intervention and interference are endemic. In extreme cases, heads of state own shares in operators (e.g., Azerbaijan and Morocco), which are then regulated by their appointees.
The independence of regulatory authorities was a relatively radical departure from the politico-administrative traditions of most countries, where institutions had been subservient to government, often personally to the president or sovereign. Independence is commonly stated for the judiciary and the central bank, sometimes guaranteed by the constitution, but even this is often for show (Kelso, 1993; Ferejohn, 1998; Singh, 1999; Venice Commission, 2010; Blancheton, 2016; Garriga, 2016; Human Rights Council, 2016; Schelkle & Mabbett, 2016) . For example, in Germany there was a slow acceptance of the almost revolutionary transition of regulation from within the ministry to an independent authority, but which was the norm in the European Union (Vogelsang, 2003) .
In autocracies, de jure independence must be viewed with skepticism, since everything and everyone is ultimately responsible to the head of state. For example, in sultanistic monarchies, there are neither independent parliaments nor judiciaries, merely bureaucracies that follow top-down directions (Chehabi & Linz, 1998) . Thus in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) was created by a decree of the emirs, as was the Supreme Committee for the Supervision of the Telecommunications Sector, which sits between the emirs and the TRA, appointing its directors and determining its budget. 5 There are neither appeals to the courts nor judicial reviews, while the only oversight is by the Supreme Committee, itself accountable solely to the emirs. To further complicate matters further, the two principal operators, Etisalat and Du, are owned and controlled by the same emirs, limiting competition on the market and competition analyses by the TRA, while ensuring any corporate political activity (CPA) is byzantine and opaque. (Davidson, 2009; Ponzini, 2011) In democracies there is expected to be formal accountability to the judiciary, which may review individual decisions of the government and of the regulatory authority, and to the parliament, which considers performance more generally (Scott, 2000; Maggetti, 2010) . Governments and parliaments determine policies and monitor the overall performance of markets and of the regulatory authority, in terms of those policies and public expectations (e.g., affordability, availability and national competitiveness). In turn, the regulatory authority monitors and responds to trends in markets and technologies. parliaments revise and refine their policies and legislation in iterative processes, endeavouring to learn from their own experiences and those of other countries, notably through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU).
Interventions by presidents and ministers can:
 Affect the market directly;  Affect the system of decision making by the regulatory authority; and  Affect the ability of the regulatory authority to enforce its decisions.
In all three categories, inappropriate interventions, which might constitute 'interference' can discourage investment or distort competition by favouring one operator over another. Obvious concerns are their personal interests, those of their families and of political cronies, for example, the requirement to issue a license to a close relative of the president or to deny one to a political rival, which is plainly interference, subverting goals of economic efficiency and consumer welfare. 6 Governance schemes that do not limit the potential for governmental opportunism, create strong inefficiencies and poor sector performance (Spiller, 2013) .
The following sections of this paper consider in turn theoretical issues, the design of regulatory systems, the independence of regulators in the United States, in the European Union and in Africa. This is followed by a discussion of problems of regulatory capture and corruption. Finally conclusions are drawn and issues identified for further research.
Theoretical issues
Approaches to the analysis of the independence of regulators typically include:
 Principal/agent problem;  Information asymmetry;  Corporate political activity (CPA); and  Capture of the regulatory authority or of the government.
In both economics and political science, the principal-agent problem, or theory of agency, describes circumstances in which a person or agent is able or empowered to make decisions on behalf of another person, the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989; Laffont & Martimort, 2002) . 7 If the agent acts in his own best interests, then problems can arise when the interests of the agent diverge from or are contrary to the interests of the principal.
The standard model for telecommunications markets in developed countries involves a chain of principal/agent problems, of the electorate charging ministers with governing, with the government charging an authority to regulate, with the authority licensing a group of operators, which then provide services to customers under contracts. These are all in the expectation of delivering widely, perhaps universally, available and affordable network services, despite the considerable complexities in the relationships, in the markets and the technologies. It is further extended, especially in the EU, by network governance and transnational legislative formulation and scrutiny (Schmidt, 1998; Thatcher, 2001) .
Part of the principal-agent problem lies in information asymmetry, where one party, usually the agent, has more or better information than the other, creating an imbalance of power, which can lead to transactions that favour the possessor of the greater or better information (Stigler, 1961; Akerlof, 1970) . Information asymmetries can also arise where one party can enforce, or effectively retaliate for breaches of, certain parts of the agreement, whereas the other cannot. NRAs are empowered to collect and to require operators to provide data to reduce such asymmetries and to protect consumers both directly and through alternative dispute resolution (ADR).
The dangers that heads of state, ministers and dominant operators capture the politicoregulatory system are difficult to assess, despite the attractions of maximising their economic rents (Laffont & Tirole, 1991; Dal Bó, 2006) . Melody (1997) described a narrow instance of regulatory capture, of the failure of regulatory authorities to exercise their independence, because of the powerful influences of ministries and incumbent operators. This prevented them from achieving effective consumer protection and economic efficiency:
The experience with competition in industries subject to weak regulation generally shows a strong tendency for both politicians and regulators to prefer selecting and managing competitors than promoting an open competitive marketplace, thereby creating a comfortably closed market for the chosen 'competitors', not the open one intended by competition policies (Melody, 1997, p. 195) .
He suggested the likely result would be an oligopoly, with prospective entrants facing high and artificial barriers to entry. Indeed, this is what is found in many countries.
However, there is little evidence of the capture of regulatory authorities in the telecommunications sector, though there have been some instances of fraud and of corruption (e.g., Liberia and Senegal). Whereas, there is growing evidence of capture of the state, in which dependent regulatory authorities are assigned roles designed not to interrupt rent seeking at a higher level or are told not to do so. There are two risks, one of a politician issuing licences to himself, his family or his cronies and thus extracting rents, the other is of an operator becoming the head of government in order to secure an already existing flow of rents. While the latter might seem implausible, prima facie, there are possible instances in Italy and in Thailand.
Designing a regulatory system
The institutional endowments of a country affect its ability to design and build a regulatory system with the capacity and credibility to restrain arbitrary administrative actions and interference (North, 1990; North, et al., 2000) . Institutional patterns and precedents influence the forms of new authorities, as do the strengths and weaknesses of the political, parliamentary and judicial systems. For example, the laws creating the regulatory system may not grant the authority the power to resist interference, the courts may be so tightly controlled that any independent decision will be struck down, or the administrative culture may preclude exercising any de jure scope for independence. In the USA an important endowment is the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) of 1946, 8 which determines the ways in which all government agencies must perform their duties, which has been tested repeatedly in the courts, resulting in a substantial jurisprudence. Thus there is a set of practices that are understood by politicians, regulators and regulates.
In a well-functioning democracy, the design of the regulatory authority is typically a collegiate body, 9 subject to a range of procedures:
o external (e.g., the appointment and dismissal of senior officials), and o internal (e.g., impact assessments of proposed regulations);  ex post:
o transparency (e.g., reasoned opinions and annual reports), and o accountability (e.g., appeals and parliamentary oversight). Bovens (2010) warns of the many meanings of accountability, importantly distinguishing between:
 An organizational virtue; and  A social relation or mechanism.
Decisions by the regulatory authority are greatly improved when subject to appeals on the merits of the case before a court or quasi-judicial tribunal (i.e., with some economists and engineers). In some jurisdictions courts may test the constitutionality of legislation. 10 A number of ministries and regulatory authorities complain of the heavy load of litigation, blaming operators that seemingly bring appeals on the least pretext, almost reflexively, certainly when they can delay implementation to disadvantage rivals or to divert the energies of the regulatory authority. Many of these are efforts to play for time, to delay implementation of a change that gives them a commercial or strategic advantage. A complication is that operators are forbidden under competition law from collusion in their commercial activities, but can and do collude in their lobbying and litigation.
Technical measures have been advocated to governments and used to strengthen initially weakly independent regulatory authorities, including:
 Freedom to control its budget;  Security of commissioners from dismissal; 11  Network governance with other regulatory authorities;  Public sessions of the commission;  Publication of minutes and reports;  Engagement with consumers; and  Publication of surveys of markets.
The relatively narrow economic functions of regulatory authorities have often been widened by the addition of ADR schemes, the promotion of the adoption of technologies, and the suppression of cybercrime. The limited use of the Internet has led to the adoption by government of a range of policies to encourage its use by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the poor and the elderly, while also protecting vulnerable users, notably children. These do not employ the conventional economic techniques used by a regulatory authority, but rather seek to stimulate demand and provide parental controls, where the regulatory authority must cooperate with operators, rather than exercising its independent economic judgement.
Part of the core set of best practice policies was privatisation of the direct state provider of telecommunications, usually a department of government that had to be converted to a corporation then sold to investors, often foreign, but sometimes domestic individuals. In Africa, although this process was contentious it was usually completed, not least because of the small size of the operators. 12 In the OECD countries the picture is mixed, with some sales being completed (e.g., Australia and the United Kingdom), but many stalling (e.g., Germany and Japan). The residual state holdings were usually transferred to pension funds or to finance ministries, but the influence of government is still thought to be considerable, including with some NRAs.
Unusually, in Singapore the regulatory function was assigned to the Infocomm Development Authority, primarily a promoter or sponsor of the ICT industry, charged with implementing the Intelligent Nation 2015 strategy (iDA Act, 2012; iDA, 2014) . In Kenya the regulatory authority was rebranded as the Communications Authority of Kenya (CAK), with the government declaring it to be a "facilitator", a body that unlike traditional regulatory authorities would not "block" progress. The use of regulatory authorities as instruments of industry policy raises obvious concerns about their function as sector antitrust authorities and, specifically, their independence, since they are likely to seek to sustain existing operators, rather than promote economic efficiency and consumer welfare. In particular, a regulatory authority has access to information needed for market analyses that could be misused in developing industry policy.
While independent regulation might be thought to be a hegemonic paradigm for the telecommunications sector, the appearance of institutional isomorphism is deceptive, with any number of permutations of functions assigned to the ministry and to the regulatory authority.
Network governance
One of the means used by regulatory authorities to reinforce their status has been through the creation of and participation in networks at global and regional levels in which they find common cause and discuss approaches to shared problems. These networks also provide credentials through participation and by citing their recommendations in their decisionmaking. International mobile roaming (IMR) that has justified a surprising number of such meetings and initiatives, being almost the only topic that is comprehensible to the average citizen or politician.
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations (UN) agency for the sector, is an active sponsor of regulatory authorities, having organized an annual Global Symposium for Regulators (GSR), since 2000 (ITU-D, 2016). The ITU has reported the growing number of regulators, though uncritically, accepting every institution declaring itself to be a regulator (see Figure 1 ). Only recently has it reported those which declare themselves to be autonomous in their decision-making, apparently 87 per cent, but without identifying which these are. The ITU also holds regional events, notably in Africa. 13 African regulatory networks have also been created by the various regional economic groupings (van Gorp & Maitland, 2009 ).
Figure 1 The number of separate regulators (ITU-D, 2016)
Much of the network governance for Internet-related topics is conducted by means of multistakeholder (MSH) bodies, such as the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) (Dutton & Peltu, 13 There are many other regional groups, e.g., associated with ASEAN and OAS. 2007; Waz & Weiser, 2013; Epstein & Nonnecke, 2016) . However, these are dominated by commercial and governmental interests, with limited involvement of regulatory authorities.
The effectiveness of network governance varies greatly. The OECD, with its analytic reports and peer reviews is a successful model across all sectors. Similarly, the EU has delivered successes, though its procedures are often complex and slow, with functions delegated by member states to regulators that then meet in networks, to comment on or to formulate policies and secondary legislation. Elsewhere, without the legal frameworks and the traditions of analysis and peer review, the networks are mostly talking shops, contributing little value to the participating nations or the independence of the regulatory authorities.
The United States of America
In a letter to Congress, Franklin Delano Roosevelt proposed the first distinct agency, resulting in the Communications Act of 1934 (U.S.C. § 151 et seq.), that created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), charged with the regulation of broadcasting, telephony and telegraphy. His particular concern had been to allow the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), from which the FCC was excised, to concentrate on the transport sector, seen as essential for restoring economic growth, avoiding the distractions of communications. 14 Congress had responded to complaints about the stranglehold of the railroads by adopting the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. This created the ICC, with its commissioners bound to the Congress, since the courts were, by their own admission, too cumbersome and lacked the necessary expertise for detailed regulation.
The US constitution, in section 8 (3), grants the Congress the power:
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
The intention of the founding fathers was likely to have been no more than a few laws, enforceable by the courts (Wille, 1996; Barnett, 2001 ). They could not have envisaged a permanent agency with a staff twenty times the number of passengers on the Mayflower (see Figure 2) , regulating a single sector of the economy, nor an equally numerous Federal Communications Bar Association (FCBA) litigating its every report and rule. Federal regulation of communications developed in stages (Paglin, 1989 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 The FCC (2016) describes itself as 'An independent U.S. government agency overseen by Congress', though independence does not appear in the legislation. Its commissioners are appointed by the President, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, often after delays and horse-trading (Dull, et al., 2012) . Not more than three of the five commissioners can be members of the same political party, while all are prohibited from employment by and investment in the communications industry. When Robert McDowell was appointed a commissioner, having previously worked for a lobbying association of carriers, he was required to withdraw from certain decisions, to avoid any perception of a conflict of interest (USG, 2014).
In explaining an apparent neglect of oversight by the Congress, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) described its preference for fire-alarm over police-patrol activities. Mechanisms had been created to enable consumers and corporations to have regulatory decisions reconsidered or reviewed: "Congress's role consists in creating and perfecting this decentralized system and, occasionally, intervening in response to complaint". Thus there is an array of methods to raise the alarm, including lobbying members of Congress, when contracts are unfair, prices are too high, or services are undelivered.
In each Congress many bills are proposed, though rarely passed, calling on the FCC to modify its rules in some way or other (see Table 1 ), often the result of lobbying by operators or broadcasters (Lessig, 2011 (2014)). Their work is aided by Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2016), which produces technical reports (see Table 2 ).
West and Raso (2013) examined how federal agencies exercise their discretion or independence in rule-making, looking at lobbying by the firms they regulate, and the concerns of Congress to which they were accountable. They found that economic interests predominated, with little use of discretion by agencies, whereas the courts and the White House tended to be reactive.
Even at the age of eighty-two the oldest telecommunications regulatory authority shows little sign of retiring and while the FCC is not absolutely independent, it holds the potential influences in a sort of balance, and when it fails it can be observed to do so and held to account. For example, the recent net neutrality rules saw dissent both within the FCC and from one of the panel of appellate judges, with operators associations currently deliberating en banc and Supreme Court appeals. 16 Rural interests have a disproportionate voice, but that reflects the position of the Congress, as expressed in hearings and repeated threats of legislation. A complex system of three branches of government has provided for continued investment in networks, with the FCC playing a central role (Cherry & Wildmann, 1999) . 
The European Union
The European Commission (EC) and a small number of EU member states began to push for liberalization of telecommunications markets in the 1980s, in order to improve competitiveness, making gradual progress with directives and recommendations, supported by annual reports on their implementation (Bruce, et al., 1986; EC, 2015a) . Member states first established regulatory authorities, later agreeing to build up their powers, independence and appellate systems (see Table 3 and Table 4 ).
Initially, the independence of the regulatory authorities was treated with skepticism by market players, being outside the political and administrative traditions of most member states. Moreover, state-owned carriers and ministries were only slowly separating, with governments retaining significant financial interests that could not easily be overlooked by regulatory authorities, whose members often initially came from the ministry or state provider. A combination of the successes of leading regulatory authorities, of state-owned operators being supported by foreign regulatory authorities to enter markets in other EU member states, and continuing EC oversight and pressure, combined with an occasional threat of an EU-level counterpart to the FCC (Lehr & Kiessling, 1999; Eurostrategies & Cullen International, 1999) , saw independence become accepted and developed. However, regulators have expressed concern that governments in some MSs were transferring function to ministries, undermining their ability to respond to competition problems, and reducing investment and consumer welfare (BEREC, 2012). between carriers 'shall act independently and shall not seek or take instructions from any other body in relation to the exercise of these tasks assigned to them', subject to constitutional law and appellate bodies. Heads or commissioners of regulatory authorities to be dismissed only if they no longer met the pre-determined conditions for the performance of their duties and the decision to dismiss them 'shall be made public at the time of dismissal' with a statement of reasons, with the individuals having 'the right to request its publication'.
The CJEU ruled that the Danish appellate body, the Teleklagenaevnet (Telecommunications Complaints Board), could not be regarded as a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU as it lacked the requisite degree of independence: 18
The concept of independence, which is inherent in the task of adjudication, implies above all that the body in question acts as a third party in relation to the authority which adopted the contested decision (judgment in RTL Belgium, C-517/09, EU:C:2010:821, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited) (TDC A/S v Erhvervsstyrelsen, 2014).
The EC is bound by treaty to enforce directives, including provisions for the independence of regulators. The EC has regularly highlighted failings, escalating these to formal notices, reasoned opinions and litigation before the CJEU (see Table 5 ) and has published details in its annual reports. For example, in Estonia, it forced structural separation, with the Ministry of Economic Affairs & Communications transferring shares in an operator, Levira, to the Ministry of Finance (Commission v Estonia, 2014). Article 4 (1) Member States shall ensure that effective mechanisms exist at national level under which any user or undertaking providing electronic communications networks and/or services who is affected by a decision of a national regulatory authority has the right of appeal against the decision to an appeal body that is independent of the parties involved. This body, which may be a court, shall have the appropriate expertise available to it to enable it to carry out its functions. Member States shall ensure that the merits of the case are duly taken into account and that there is an effective appeal mechanism. Pending the outcome of any such appeal, the decision of the national regulatory authority shall stand, unless the appeal body decides otherwise. 2009/140/EC Article 4(1) amended the final sentence: Pending the outcome of the appeal, the decision of the national regulatory authority shall stand, unless interim measures are granted in accordance with national law. In response to a request from the EC on the independence of the regulator, the parliament adopted an amendment in 2014 to the Law on Regulators of Public Utilities, providing for the publication in the Latvian Official Gazette Latvijas Vēstnesis of a statement of reasons for dismissal if the concerned SPRK Council member so requests. Netherlands
The government decided to merge NMA and OPTA to create ACM, to be an independent administrative body under the supervision of the Minister of Economic Affairs. The EC raised concerns regarding the independence requirements and, in particular, regarding an initially foreseen power of the Minister to annul certain ACM decisions. In August 2014, an amendment to the law removed this power in respect of the electronic communications sector. In November 2014, the Dutch legislature repealed previous amendments to the Telecommunications Law and the Media Law concerning obligations upon providers of programme services after the Commission had expressed concerns about the limiting effect of these provisions on the independence and discretion of the regulator in executing its responsibilities for market analysis.
The EC (2015b) noted significant improvements in several member states, following its enquiries and actions, eliminating some forms of ministerial or legislative intervention (e.g., Belgium, the Netherlands and France) and reinforcing safeguards against dismissal of the regulator (e.g., Latvia and Sweden). Restructuring of an NRA had often been motivated by cost savings, or:
The second [motivation] is Member States' propensity to keep or regain control of regulatory issues by transferring competences back to ministries (Spain), trying to ensure a power of review (Belgium, the Netherlands), influencing the NRA's decisions by exercising control over its work programme (Belgium, Portugal, Slovenia) or giving it policy directions (Ireland).
The EC successfully exported its regulatory state model to the new member states (NMS), which also joined the regulatory governance networks. This was extended to the Western Balkans, where yet more countries have been negotiating membership (Cullen, 2013) , subject to close monitoring, which has identified significant problems around regulatory independence (see Table 6 ). Whereas, the EC was uniformly unsuccessful with neighbouring countries in North Africa and the Levant, since there was no offer of EU membership that might overcome the very weak institutional endowments (Frontier Economics, 2007) . Similarly, its work in Sub-Saharan Africa pointed to the benefits of independent regulators, but offered nothing to the countries concerned to address democratic, judicial and parliamentary failings (HIPSSA, 2014) . The EC was unable or unwilling to press the independence of regulatory authorities beyond accession and candidate countries, elsewhere accepting very superficial observance. A further factor in improving regulation has been the widespread adoption of impact assessments (IA) (Radaelli, 2009) , for which the EC has created a Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) to ensure IAs use a rigorous methodology (EC, 2016). As regulatory authorities adopt IAs, this improves the quality of their decision-making, since they must make a positive case, one that can be defended on appeal.
Independence of regulatory authorities in the EU can be better described as a process than a condition, something which is evolving as MSs, NRAs and governance networks. It is clearly a topic on which the EC finds the need to maintain pressure on MSs, to counter their apparent desire to take greater control of markets.
Africa
Governance in Africa is seen as weak, even or especially when authoritarian, often with crucial elements missing or ineffective (Noman, et al., 2012; Fund for Peace, 2015) , including:
 Parliamentary oversight of ministers and agencies;  National audit offices;  Judicial review;  Independence of central banks and judiciary; and  Competition authorities.
Almost without exception, governments created telecommunications regulatory authorities, which were said to be independent and accountable. This might illustrate the credible commitment to abstain from arbitrary interventions and interference, or that the regulatory authority had been subverted by and for patronage, or that it was entirely subservient to senior politicians (see Table 7 ) (Prado, 2012) . Crucial powers, especially licensing, were frequently retained by governments. Yet there has been no lack of enthusiasm for investment, but this is so great and so uniform that it seems to be unrelated to regulatory commitments (e.g., in conflict and post-conflict states).
The regulatory authorities fail to collect, or do not have the power to demand, the data needed for antitrust analyses of markets, uniformly unable to measure competition and to identify market bottlenecks, thus to pursue economic efficiency and consumer welfare. Engagement with non-governmental organizations has been limited by the expert nature of the dialogue, and by the limited resources of NGOs and their focus on basic needs, which might otherwise have added to their institutional legitimacy (Hochstetler, 2012) . Moreover, there are very few think tanks, university research groups or other independent research able to fill the vacuum. Consequently, citizens are not in a position to ring the fire alarm, nor are there data to alert them to do so. Ministry of Justice appoints some of the staff of RURA, those with "judicial police powers" and its representatives in court. It is "supervised by the Prime Minister's Office" and must submit annual reports to government and parliament., while the "Supervising Organ of RURA has the power to nullify any decision". Decisions can be, but very rarely are, appealed to the courts. Unusually, the "investment arm" of the ruling Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) has had a substantial stake in MTN Rwanda (the leading wireless operator) since it was created, linking the Prime Minister's Office, the Supervising Organ and MTN Rwanda. South Africa
The majority of commissioners have come from the ruling African National Congress (ANC). There is a long history of interventions by ANC ministers in decisions by the regulator. Government retains and will keep a substantial holding in Telkom, the incumbent operator, plus two wholly owned carriers: Infraco and Sentech. While the Constitution states the Independent Broadcasting Authority is independent, since it was merged with SATRA to create ICASA, a new regulatory authority, the provision is uncertain. Parliament has taken limited interest and made few inquiries, despite serious problems with service provision. Uganda s.13 of the Communications Act of 1997 declares the regulatory authority to be independent, restated in the 2013 Act, but in which s.7 gives the minister power to issue policy guidelines to the Commission. It must provide quarterly reports to the minister, which it does not publish. The Act creates a board of non-executive directors, though no details are available of its members, except for the Executive Director of UCC. Parliament has taken almost no interest in the work of the UCC. Zambia s.5 of the ICT Act of 2009 declares the regulatory authority to be autonomous and that it "shall not be subject to the direction of any other person or authority". It should consult the competition authority on matters of competition in the sector, but does not appear to have done so. It is required to publish an annual report to the minister, but this is not available on its web site. Appeals against decisions are heard by a tribunal specially appointed by the minister, then by the High Court, but very rarely invoked. The board of the authority comprises nine non-executive directors, including representatives from the ICT and home affairs ministries, the national security agency and the Attorney General.
Appeals against the decisions of regulatory authorities have been rare, perhaps because judicial systems were ineffective, incompetent or very slow. Parliamentarians have shown little interest in oversight, since it does not create rewards; rather it is likely to cause them to be seen as troublemakers by the ruling party or, more especially, the head of state. The reelection of MPs depends on the party ticket, not on a record of scrutinizing government and its agencies. Thus regulatory authorities have largely been left to their own devices, often in rather narrow technical fields.
African countries generally committed to the WTO for the independence of their regulatory authority. Many had privatized their fixed carriers, obviating the primary requirement for independence, though in several countries issues arise from head of state presidents owning staked in operators. Heads of state have been happy to appoint commissioners only from one party, even government ministers, viewing staffing of the regulatory authority as a way to reward party supporters, sometimes even those lacking technical qualifications. The operators clearly understand this and lobby the president and minister accordingly, recognizing where the power lies or engage in corrupt-dealing (Sutherland, 2014) .
In Nigeria the regulatory authority faces challenges of avoiding regulatory capture and of ensnarement in pervasive governmental corruption (Opata, 2013 While the generic model of a regulatory authority has been very widely adopted it is difficult to find evidence of any meaningful independence. Structural ex post accountability is very rare, in either judicial or parliamentary forms, while ex ante measures are often disregarded. The pursuit of economic efficiency, through market analyses and procompetitive regulatory measures, is almost unknown. Instead authorities copy and paste measures, often from OECD countries, without assessing their likely effect on competition., or adapting them to local conditions Despite these problems there has been considerable investment in networks, largely by commercial operators making arrangements directly with senior figures in government. This raises an obvious question as to why governments have not expropriated assets (e.g., nationalisation) or profits (e.g., by slashing prices), with most governments lacking the money to support network investment, while enjoying significant flows of tax revenues. The recent fine levied by the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) against the MTN Group is one instance of several attempts at expropriation, in which it seems to have raised USD 1.7 billion from its own citizens.
Conclusion
The independence of a telecommunications regulatory authority is found more in the breach than in the observance. Outside the USA the only region with a reasonable claim to the independence of its regulatory authorities is the European Union, together with its accession and candidate countries. A robust design, the prospect of membership with its treaty obligations, the cross-border activities of operators, oversight and enforcement by the European Commission, and participation by ministries and regulatory authorities in EU governance networks, have together proved able to overcome weaknesses in national institutional endowments.
The USA achieved its present status from its institutional endowments, the historical culture of litigiousness, ensuring parties can sue one another, and the 1946 Administrative Procedures Act. The FCC sits amidst a complex network of analysts, lobbyists, litigators, and legislators, with a constant supply of ideas to challenge the status quo, through comments, lobbying and litigation. While it may not be truly independent, it is constantly exposed to ideas and challenged on its decisions, including by its own commissioners.
In Africa the independent regulatory authority is an artefact, something to be shown to visitors, but not to fool operators. They are creatures of government, following directions, providing employment for those connected to the administration, only some of whom have the necessary technical skills. Parliamentary oversight is almost entirely absent, since MPs are beholden to their leaders for re-election, while their electors are concerned about government spending in their locality, rather than with handling of their complaints or scrutiny of agencies, government and legislation. Similarly, judges know that continuation in office, let alone promotion, depends on not giving favourable outcomes to reviews of the decisions of ministers or appeals against decisions of regulatory authorities. Politicoadministrative systems have been designed to ensure top-down control, rather than to provide checks and balances, with any appearance to the contrary being just that. There is remarkably little evidence of the use of statutory independence or of efforts to build it upto pursue economic efficiency or consumer welfare. Regulatory authorities are either incapable of or unwilling to address market failures, not even collecting the essential market data, since any remedies that might be necessary are "above their pay grade", as markets are designed by presidents or sovereigns. Recognizing the reality of weak institutional endowments, operators have lobbied the 'big man' in order to obtain licences and preferential commercial terms, sometimes corruptly, for example, taking a relative as a business partner. Operators rarely engage in litigation, knowing cases will be heard only slowly and that the judicial dice are heavily loaded. Regulatory independence is a form of theatre, in which the operators play their roles.
The division of labour in the operation of ministries and regulatory authorities in Africa requires further examination, looking at specific themes (e.g., licensing, interconnection rates and universal service). Comparative studies amongst African countries would be beneficial, notably between Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone groups, each with a different administrative tradition, as would comparisons with Latin America and Asia. As governments in OECD countries add to the work of their regulatory authorities, requiring them to cooperate with operators and persuade them to perform various tasks, there is a danger of undermining independence, something that ought to be explored.
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